Casenotes: Constitutional Law — First Amendment — Dismissal of State Employee for Distributing Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech Tangentially Affected Public Concern and Questionnaire Had Potential to Disrupt Office, Undermine Supervisory Authority, and Destroy Close Working Relationships. Connick v. Meyers, 103 S. Ct. 1984 (1983) by Thornton, Kevin
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 13
Issue 2 Winter 1984 Article 9
1984
Casenotes: Constitutional Law — First
Amendment — Dismissal of State Employee for
Distributing Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech
Tangentially Affected Public Concern and
Questionnaire Had Potential to Disrupt Office,
Undermine Supervisory Authority, and Destroy
Close Working Relationships. Connick v. Meyers,
103 S. Ct. 1984 (1983)
Kevin Thornton
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thornton, Kevin (1984) "Casenotes: Constitutional Law — First Amendment — Dismissal of State Employee for Distributing
Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech Tangentially Affected Public Concern and Questionnaire Had Potential to Disrupt Office,
Undermine Supervisory Authority, and Destroy Close Working Relationships. Connick v. Meyers, 103 S. Ct. 1984 (1983)," University
of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 13: Iss. 2, Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol13/iss2/9
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIRST AMENDMENT - DISMIS-
SAL OF STATE EMPLOYEE FOR DISTRIBUTING QUESTION-
NAIRE UPHELD WHERE SPEECH TANGENTIALLY 
AFFECTED PUBLIC CONCERN AND QUESTIONNAIRE HAD 
POTENTIAL TO DISRUPT OFFICE, UNDERMINE SUPERVI-
SORY AUTHORITY, AND DESTROY CLOSE WORKING RELA-
TIONSHIPS. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). 
An assistant district attorney in New Orleans opposed her pending 
transfer to another section of the criminal court and informed her su-
pervisor that the transfer policy was unsound. In an attempt to demon-
strate that her views were shared by others in the office she prepared a 
fourteen-item questionnaire l concerning the transfer policy and distrib-
uted it to her co-workers during lunch and office hours. The district 
attorney subsequently dismissed her since he viewed her reaction to the 
transfer as open defiance of office policy and as a disruption of office 
routine. She filed suit in the United States District Court for Eastern 
Louisiana under 42 U.S.c. § 19832 alleging that her first amendment 
right of free speech had been violated.3 The district court held that the 
questionnaire and its distribution were protected speech.4 The United 
I. The questionnaire read as follows: 
Please take the few minutes it will require to fill this out. You can freely 
express your opinion WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED . 
•••••• **** •••••••• ** •••••••••••••• ** •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
1. How long have you been in the Office? 
2. Were you moved as a result of the recent transfers? 
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by 
any superior prior to the notice of them being posted? 
4. Do you think as a matter of policy, they should have been? 
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding 
transfers has been fair? 
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the Office? 
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance 
of A.D.A. [Assistant District Attorney] personnel? 
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale? 
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments 
through rumor? 
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of: 
Bridget Bane 
Fred Harper 
Lindsay Larson 
Joe Meyer 
Dennis Waldron 
II. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on be-
half of office supported candidates? 
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be a worthwhile addition 
to the office structure? 
13. How would you rate office morale? 
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have. 
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY. 
Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1694 (1983). 
2. 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976). 
3. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1686-87 (1983). 
4. Connick v. Myers, 507 F. Supp. 752, 759 (E.D. La.), affd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.5 The Supreme 
Court, in a close decision, reversed and held that the discharge of the 
employee did not violate the first amendment because the speech 
touched upon public concern in only the most limited sense and, in 
addition, the questionnaire had the potential to disrupt the office, un-
dermine authority, and destroy close working relationships.6 
Although freedom of speech has traditionally been given broad 
protection by courts, public employees have not always enjoyed first 
amendment protection. In the late 1800's public employers were al-
lowed to suspend the constitutional rights of employees as a condition 
of employment. This policy, referred to as the right/privilege doctrine, 
was based on the premise that a person had no constitutional right to 
public employment. The citizen was free to choose between the exer-
cise of his rights and the acceptance of the privilege of public employ-
ment that might restrict those rights.7 
The right/privilege distinction remained intact for over seventy 
years. In 1967, however, the Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents 8 
rejected the premise "that public employment ... may be conditioned 
upon the surrender of constitutional rights which could not be abridged 
by direct government action."9 Under this rationale the right/privilege 
distinction could no longer be used to justify restrictions on the rights 
of public employees. Thus, the Keyishian Court viewed a public em-
1981), rev'(/, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). In cases involving dismissal of employees for 
speaking out the employee must show: (I) that his speech is protected; and (2) that 
his speech was the substantial or motivating factor in his dismissal. Connick, 507 
F. Supp. at 756. Since the Supreme Court in Connick reversed the district court 
on the protected speech issue, this case note is limited to an analysis of that issue. 
For a discussion of the employee's second burden, see Mt. Healthy City School 
Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977). 
5. Connick v. Myers, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1684 (1983). 
6. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689-90 (1983) (5-4 decision). It is unclear 
whether the Court's holding extends to speech made outside the workplace. Al-
though the Court's language is broad enough to encompass all public employee 
speech, Connick dealt with the in-house statements of a public employee. 
7. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). In dis-
missing a policeman's first amendment claim, Justice Holmes, writing for the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated "[t)he petitioner may have a con-
stitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a police-
man." Id at 220, 29 N.E. at 517. This language became the foundation of the 
right/privilege doctrine that guided courts in employee first amendment claims 
for over 70 years. See Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An 
Emerging Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 
409-12 (1968). 
8. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
9. Id at 605. In rejecting the right/privilege distinction, the Keyishian Court relied 
on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Id at 605-06; see also Van Al-
styne, The Demise of the RighI-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 
HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1445-46 (1968) ("Essentially, this doctrine declares that 
whatever an express constitutional provision forbids government to do directly it 
equally forbids government to do indirectly."). 
1984) Connick v. Myers 367 
ployee's rights as equal to those of the general public. 10 
Within one year, however, the Court recognized that the state, in 
certain circumstances, could restrict first amendment rights. In Picker-
ing v. Board of Education, 11 the Court recognized that the state had a 
special interest in providing efficient services to the public that might 
justify otherwise unconstitutional restrictions on employment. 12 The 
Court formulated a balancing test to determine if those restrictions 
were valid. Under this test, the state's interest in providing services to 
the public was weighed against the employee's interest in commenting 
on matters of public concern. I3 Central to the decision was the intro-
duction of several factors that determine the strength of the competing 
interests. In striking the balance in favor of the public employee, the 
Pickering Court held that the interest in preserving the employee's 
speech was great because of the public nature of the forum and the 
public importance of the speech.I4 In addition, the employee's position 
was strengthened because his speech did not relate to his present em-
ployment position.I5 By contrast, the state's interest was weakened be-
cause the statement did not threaten close working relationships, cause 
friction among co-workers, undermine an immediate supervisor's disci-
pline, or call into question the employee's fitness to perform his 
10. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06; see also Note, Judicial Protection 0/ Teachers' 
Speech: The Ajiermath 0/ Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1256, 1260-61 (1974) (the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine placed the state in the unrealistic position of 
being able to restrict employee speech only if the same restriction could be placed 
on the general public). 
11. 391 U.S. 563 (1968) .. 
12. Id at 568. The scope of employee first amendment rights is narrower under the 
Pickering balancing test than under a strict application of the doctrine of uncon-
stitutional conditions. First amendment protection under the Pickering Court's 
approach is determined by a balancing of interests rather than a test to determine 
if the restriction could constitutionally be placed on the general public. See Con-
nick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1695 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
13. Id The Pickering Court did not clarify the respective burdens for each party 
under the balancing test. Despite this ambiguity, lower federal courts that have 
applied the balancing test have required the employee first to show that he was 
fired because of his expression. The burden then shifts to the government to show 
some actual interference with its interest. These courts then balance the extent of 
impairment to the government's interest against the employee's interest in speak-
ing on matters of public concern. See Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expres-
sion 0/ Public Employees, 76 MICH. L. REV. 365, 369-70 (1977); see, e.g., Janetta v. 
Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 (4th Cir. 1975); Pennsylvania ex rei Rafferty v. Phila-
delphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 507-09 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The Court's 
opinion in Connick requires the public employee to show initially that his speech 
is on matters of public concern before any further balancing occurs. Connick v. 
Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). 
14. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-74. 
15.ld In Pickering these factors supported the employee's contention that his speech 
was on matters of public concern. Pickering, a teacher, wrote a letter to a local 
newspaper criticizing a proposed increase in school expenditures. The Court 
noted that these expenditures were a matter of general public interest, the local 
newspaper was a public forum, and the expenditures were irrelevant to his class-
room teaching. Id 
368 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 13 
duties. 16 
After Pickering, the Court extended the balancing test to in-house 
communication between a public employee and his immediate supervi-
sor. 17 The Court, however, explained that when private expression of 
the employee is at issue courts must also consider when, where, and 
how the employee confronted his supervisor. 18 
The Pickering Court's application of the balancing test left a 
number of issues unresolved. For example, it was unclear whether first 
amendment protection extended to public employee speech not involv-
ing matters of public concern. 19 The Court also failed to explain under 
what circumstances the individual factors in the balancing process 
would be given additional weight and what affect this weight would 
have on the burden of proof.20 In Connick, the Court addressed these 
issues. 
Connick can be divided into a two-part analysis of public em-
ployee speech.21 The first part limits review of employee free speech 
claims to those involving matters of public concern. The second part 
focuses on the actual balancing process that occurs after the employee's 
speech is found to involve matters of public concern. 
The Connick Court initially held that when a public employee 
does not speak as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but as an 
employee on matters of personal interest, federal courts cannot review 
the personnel decisions taken by the public employer in reaction to that 
speech.22 The Court justified this limitation on the scope of public em-
ployee first amendment protection through an analysis of the history of 
16. Id. These factors failed to show any interference with the state's interest because 
Pickering's letter did not mention fellow employees or immediate supervisors, and 
it did not concern his classroom performance. 
17. See Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 410-14 (1979). 
18. Id. at 415 n.4. 
19. An inter-circuit conflict existed on the issue of whether employee speech not in-
volving matters of public concern was protected. Compare Waters v. Chaffin, 684 
F.2d 833, 838 (lith Cir. 1982) (public concern was not a threshold issue, but was 
merely a factor in the balancing test) with Chitwood v. Feaster, 468 F.2d 359, 360-
61 (4th Cir. 1972) (as a preliminary issue, the content of the speech must be more 
than mere bickering or a running dispute). Other circuits, foreshadowing the deci-
sion in Connick, held that expression dealing with the internal operations of the 
employee's agency are unprotected because it did not involve public concern. See 
Schmidt v. Fremont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 984-85 (10th Cir. 1977); 
Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 
(1973). 
20. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.3 (Court recognized that one or more of the factors 
might acquire additional weight); see Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 nA (1979) (Court set out time, place, and manner factors 
but did not explain what affect they would have on the government's burden). 
21. Under the first issue, courts must apply the Pickering balancing test if the em-
ployee speech addresses a matter of public concern. By contrast, if the employee 
speech does not address a matter of public concern, the speech is unreviewable by 
courts absent unusual circumstances. 
22. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1689-90 (1983). 
1984) Connick v. Myers 369 
public employee first amendment rights. In examining pre- and post-
Pickering cases applying the balancing test, the Connick Court noted 
that each case emphasized the social and political importance of the 
speech?3 This led the Court to conclude that unless the employee's 
questionnaire could be characterized as constituting a matter of public 
concern, it would be unnecessary to review the government's discipli-
nary action.24 
The Court justified the public concern requirement by stressing 
the government's need for wide latitude in employee decisions and the 
need to limit frivolous first amendment claims.25 Connick recognized 
that employee speech on matters of public concern is protected under 
the first amendment but held that these claims would be reviewed only 
under the most unusual circumstances.26 
Initially, the public concern requirement seems to be only a mini-
mal intrusion on public employee rights. It is certainly reasonable to 
give wide latitude to the employer's need to maintain office discipline 
and avoid excessive litigation over personnel disputes. The problem, 
though, is that the Court requires a finding of public concern before the 
balancing of any interests. This requirement was not present in the 
Court's previous holdings on public concern. The Pickering decision 
recognized that employee speech might be restricted if it interfered 
with the efficient performance of governmental duties.27 When inter-
ference occurred, the employee's free speech right would be balanced 
against the government's interest, and public concern was merely a fac-
tor in determining which interest would prevail,2s The Connick deci-
sion reverses this process by placing the initial burden on the employee 
to prove public concern before the government must show any interfer-
ence with its interest. In effect, the government is free to restrict em-
ployee free speech rights on issues that are not matters of public 
concern. This seems contrary to the principle that the government may 
not constitutionally restrict first amendment rights as a condition of 
employment. 29 
The Court's opinion also set forth the standard used to determine 
whether the employee's speech involves matters of public concern. 
23. Id at 1688-90. 
24. Id at 1689. 
25. Id at 1690. 
26. Id The Court did not give examples of what circumstances would trigger review 
absent a showing of public concern. One unusual circumstance, however, might 
be the dismissal of an employee for social conversation made away from the work 
place. See Waters v. Chaffin, 684 F.2d 833 (lith Cir. 1982) (police officer during 
conversation at local tavern referred to another officer in disparaging terms). If 
restrictions on this type of speech are not reviewable, courts cannot redress con-
tent restriction. 
27. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1695 (1983) (Brennan J., dissenting); see supra 
notes 11-16. 
28. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). 
29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Public concern is determined by the content, form, and context of the 
statement.30 Although the Court made no attempt to define these fac-
tors, it appears that the content factor was used to evaluate the subject 
matter of the speech, the form factor was used to examine how the 
speech was delivered, and the context factor encompassed why and 
where the employee spoke? 1 Under this test only one of the em-
ployee's fourteen questions raised a public concern issue.32 The Court 
then proceeded to explain why the remaining questions were not mat-
ters of public concern. 
The Connick Court concluded that the purpose of the question-
naire was not to inform the public about government wrongdoing or 
inefficiency, but rather to continue the employment dispute over the 
transfer. 33 The employee's distribution of the questionnaire in-house 
with no subsequent release to the public further supports this conclu-
sion.34 Had the questionnaire been released to the public, its format 
would have conveyed only the employee's dissatisfaction.35 Under 
these circumstances the content of the questions that related to office 
morale and discipline could be matters of public concern, but the con-
text and form of the speech precluded this finding. 36 
The majority's content, form, and context standard narrows the 
scope of public concern in employee free speech cases. Speech that 
would have traditionally fallen within the ambit of public concern may 
be denied this protection on the basis of where, why, and how the em-
ployee spoke.37 The Court apparently reasoned that the employee's 
choice of forum, motivation for speaking, and form of speech may pre-
vent the public from benefiting from the content of the speech.38 This 
rationale ignores the broad protection the first amendment has given 
speech that may inform the public about how it is governed.39 The 
public concern inquiry should be made in light of the Court's long-
standing commitment to free, unhindered debate on public issues. 
That where, why, and how the employee speaks might prevent the 
speech from becoming part of the public debate is irrelevant. As the 
dissent explained, the potential to add to the store of public knowledge 
should be sufficient. 40 
30. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1690 (1983). 
31. See id at 1690-91. While subject matter is taken into consideration, it is not con-
trolling. The form of the employee's speech was a questionnaire. The context 
focused on the motivation for the speech. Here that motivation consisted of an 
attempt to turn her employment dispute into a "cause celebre." Id 
32. Id at 1691. 
33. Id at 1690-91. 
34.ld 
35. Id 
36.ld 
37. Id at 1697 n.2 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
38. Id at 1690-91. 
39. Id at 1698-99 nn.4-5 (Brennan J., dissenting). 
40. Id at 1696-99. Alternatively, Justice Brennan suggested that these factors may 
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The context factor of the public concern standard places the great-
est burden on the employee who chooses to communicate in-house. It 
not only narrows the scope of public concern because of where and 
why the employee speaks, but it also chills the private expression of 
public employees. The subjective nature of the context factor creates a 
fear that a retaliatory firing will not be reviewable. This signals a re-
traction of the Court's previous view that free speech guarantees are 
not lost to public employees who choose to express their views in-
house.41 . 
The second part of the Court's analysis in Connick explains the 
application of the balancing process to the employee's questionnaire. 
One of the questions, which asked if co-workers felt pressure to work 
for political candidates, was a matter of public concern.42 Since the 
question also contributed to the employee's discharge, the Court bal-
anced the respective interests to determine if the firing infringed on the 
employee's first amendment rights. The Court held that the govern-
ment's burden in justifying a particular discharge is a flexible one that 
severely limit employee in-house speech. Justice Brennan did not accept the ma-
jority's distinction that some speech is so inherently a matter of public concern 
(e.g., race discrimination) that where and why the employee speaks need not be 
balanced, but employee speech not inherently involving public concern must be 
subjected to the content, form, and context test. To appreciate the distinction be-
tween the approaches taken by the majority and dissent, it is important to note 
that the majority views public concern as a threshold issue. Thus, these factors 
could eliminate the need to proceed to the balancing test. The dissent's approach, 
however, views public concern simply as one factor in the balancing test. The 
dissent would not narrow the concept of public concern, but would emphasize the 
impact of where and why the employee speaks by closely analyzing the impact of 
the speech on the government's interest. This would be done by giving more 
weight to the public's interest in preserving employee discipline and harmony at 
the work place. Id at 1699. The dissent, though, does not explain how this added 
weight to the government's interest would affect its burden of showing interfer-
ence with the efficient operation of government services. 
41. Givhan v. Western Line Conso!. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). The 
chilling effect that these factors have on employee speech is best illustrated by 
analyzing their impact on a 1967 federal district court case decided under the 
traditional content test. Pilkington v. Bevilaqua, 439 F. Supp. 465 (D. R.I. 1967). 
In Pilkington, the employee was a state hospital administrator at an inpatient 
mental health unit. The state adopted an expedited program to update records 
that forced a shift of personnel from patient care to clinical duties. As a result, 
both staff morale and patient care suffered. The administrator openly resisted the 
new policy and encouraged staff members to ignore clerical duties in favor of 
patient care. Id at 468-72. The district court found the context of the employee's 
expression to be of public concern regardless of the forum. Id at 474-77. The 
employee's first amendment claim is weakened when the form and content factors 
are added to the analysis. He was directly affected by the new policy as an em-
ployee and his opposition to the policy arose in the context of a dispute over its 
implementation. Therefore, under the Connick analysis, the employee may not 
have a cause of action even if he is fired for speaking on matters of public impor-
tance. The doubt created by the Connick test can only encourage employees to 
remain silent. 
42. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1691 (1983); see supra note 32. 
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varies depending on the nature of the employee's speech.43 If the pub-
lic concern value of the speech is minimal then an employer's reason-
able belief that the speech will disrupt the office is sufficient to justify 
the discharge.44 The Connick Court therefore considered several fac-
tors to determine whether the employee's discharge was based on a rea-
sonable belief that her speech could disrupt the office. Initially, the 
Court found that the content of one of her questions, which asked if 
employees had confidence in their supervisors, carried the clear poten-
tial for undermining office relations.45 The Court then examined the 
time, place, and manner in which the questionnaire was distributed and 
concluded that the distribution of the questionnaire at the office sup-
ported the district attorney's fear that the office routine would be dis-
rupted.46 Finally, the context in which the dispute developed related to 
the employee's employment dispute and thus justified the district attor-
ney's fear that close working relationships would be hindered.47 
The Court held that under these circumstances the employee's 
speech was unprotected.48 Her speech had little public concern value 
because it was analogous to an employee grievance. This limited first 
amendment interest did not require the government to show any actual 
disruption with its services. the supervisor's reasonable belief that the 
speech would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy 
close working relationships was sufficient to justify the employee's 
discharge.49 
The Court's holding that some speech on matters of public con-
cern is unprotected because the employer reasonably believed that it 
would disrupt government service is inconsistent with Supreme Court 
precedent. For example, in Pickering the Court found that the em-
ployee's speech did not interfere with the regular operation of the 
schoo1.50 Lower courts have interpreted this to require the government 
to show some actual interference with its interest before justifying any 
restriction on employee speech.51 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
43. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1691-93 (1983). 
44. Id. at 1692-93. Although the Court stated that a stronger showing might be neces-
sary if the employee's speech more substantially involves matters of public con-
cern, it did not indicate whether the government must show actual, substantial, or 
some other form of interference to meet its burden of justifying the discharge. Id. 
45. Id. at 1691-92. 
46. Id. at 1693. 
47. Id. In effect, the content, context, and form factors are used twice in the balancing 
test: once to determine public concern and again in measuring whether the speech 
interfered with the government's interest. Although the Court substituted "man-
ner" for "form," the terms appear to be synonomous. See id. at 1696 (Brennan J., 
dissenting). 
48. Id. at 1693-94. 
49. Id. 
50. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-74 (1968). 
51. Eg., Tygrett v. Washington, 543 F.2d 840, 848-50 (D.C. Cir. 1974); James v. 
Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566,571 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines 
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Community School District, 52 the Court held that the government must 
show a material and substantial interference with the operation of the 
schooP3 In sum, these cases demonstrate that the government is re-
quired to show at least some actual harm to its interest.54 
In support of its new reliance on a potential disruption standard 
the Court cited decisions that held that the government can place con-
tent and speaker restrictions on activities that are incompatible with the 
intended use of government property.55 Under these circumstances a 
reasonable apprehension of disruption justifies a ban on speech. By 
extending this logic to public employee free speech cases, the Court 
implies that because the government could directly censor the general 
public's speech in these situations, it can also condition employment on 
similar restrictions. Although the Court's analogy is logically consis-
tent with the rejection of the right/privilege distinction,56 it fails to con-
sider the public's interest in preserving the employee's speech, 
especially when public disclosure might negatively affect the working 
relationship between the employee and his immediate supervisor.57 
The Court has recognized the public employee's right to express his 
views directly to his immediate supervisor. 58 To remain viable the em-
ployee's in-house free speech right must include speech on controver-
sial subjects, especially potentially disruptive speech that is critical of 
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969»; see Note, supra note 
13, at 380; Note, supra note 10, at 1280. 
52. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
53. Id. at 508-09. 
54. See note 51 and accompanying text. See a/so Bidwell v. Hazelwood School Dept., 
491 F.2d 490, 493-95 (8th Cir. 1974) ("In a situation of potential disruption there 
is no requirement that. . . authorities must wait for the blow to fall before taking 
remedial measures."); see a/so Note, supra note 13, at 380-81 nn.65-67 (most 
courts have read Pickering to require actual impairment); Note, supra note 10, at 
1266-68 (discussing the circumstances that might justify use of a less than actual 
impairment standard). 
55. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1692 n.12 (1983). The Court cited Perry Educ. 
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educ. Ass'n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983), and Greer v. Spock, 424 
U.S. 828 (1976). Both of these cases concerned the ability of the government to 
restrict access to public property that was not a public forum. The Perry Court 
allowed the exclusion of a rival union from access to employee mail boxes. In 
Greer, the Court upheld the denial of access of political candidates to Fort Dix, 
New Jersey. 
56. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also Van Alystne, supra note 9 (fur-
ther discussion of right/privilege distinction). 
57. See Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 546 F.2d 560 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 937 
(1977). Sprague involved an assistant district attorney who was fired for stating 
to a newspaper reporter that the district attorney had not told the truth about a 
recommendation of parole. The Third Circuit upheld the firing because the pub-
lic statement caused an irreparable breach of confidence that destroyed close 
working relationships. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 563 (1972) (excellent discussion of the public's interest in preserving 
employee speech). 
58. Givhan v. Western Line Consolo School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). 
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the agency. 59 Despite the majority's analogy between the general pub-
lic's limited right to expression on government property that is not a 
public forum and employee free speech rights, precedent does not war-
rant a reduction of the government's burden in justifying an employee 
discharge. 
The government's need to maintain close working relationships 
does not justify the adoption of a potential disruption standard. The 
adoption of this standard allows the employer's judgment to determine 
whether protection will be accorded to the employee's speech. When 
the employer's judgment controls, public employees will refrain from 
criticizing their supervisors and thereby deprive the public of a valua-
ble source of information.6o The detrimental effects of this deprivation 
cannot be mitigated by varying the government's burden according to 
the degree of public importance attached to the employee's speech. Be-
cause of their knowledge of internal policies, employees are in the best 
position to speak about policies directly affecting them. Since the con-
text factor increases the likelihood that this type of speech will be char-
acterized as an internal dispute, it also decreases the probability that 
the employee will speak out on issues upon which he is most 
informed.61 
The Connick Court attempted to adjust the balancing process to 
the realities involved in administering government offices. The Court 
sought to exclude employee grievances from first amendment protec-
tion. In accomplishing its task, the Court adopted the context, form, 
and content factors to determine whether the employee's speech was 
motivated by an employment dispute or a legitimate desire to comment 
on matters of public concern. These issues, however, are not mutually 
exclusive. Employees often do not address matters that are of legiti-
mate public concern until these matters directly affect them in the 
course of their employment. The use of the form and content factors to 
delineate between important public speech and employee grievances is 
much too subjective an inquiry on which to rest first amendment rights. 
The application of these factors in determining when speech is permis-
sible, coupled with the Court's recognition that an employer's assess-
ment of potential harm may justify terminating the employee, 
substantially erodes the Court's previous holding that free speech is not 
"lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately 
with his employer rather than spread his views before the public."62 
Kevin Thornton 
59. For example, a school principal may exclude outsiders from the school building 
because they would disrupt the school. That same authority, however, should not 
be used to justify the silencing of in-house criticism by employees. 
60. Connick v. Myers, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 1701 (1983) (Brennan J., dissenting). 
61. An exception would be a matter of inherent public concern, such as race discrimi-
nation. Id at 1691 n.8. 
62. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979). 
